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My title is ate田eWhat is really on o俄r1s more h1stoncal and less top1cal 
than merely a d1scuss1on of the issues c田冗ntlybedeviling the Pacific relat10nsh1p. 
The JUS!Ification for looking ra出町cursorilyat由estate of play of the polit1cal story 
(Kobe），血eeconomic problems ( c師）四dthe wider regional context (Korea) is two-
fold. Fmt, it is patently 1mposs1ble to compete with CNN and, secondly, gainmg 
evidence血atmight salts今回academicaudience is hkely to prove impossible. All I 
C四 attemptis a回pids町veyof血epresent, followed by a lengthierreview of the past 
halfc田町yof US-Japan relations, and then finally四 0白erquick spurt on出eme-
dmm-tenn ft山田of出ealliance.τ1te paper is therefore an undrinkable cocktail of 
one part newspaper headhnes, one p副 conventionalhistory剖 da d田hof抽出logy.
rary historians町enot racing tipste目印d血atthe ・onlyhorse races they can claun to 
report and analyse町宮thosealready won or lost', the last section breaks al the rul目
。fmy回 dennion.
Definmg the present even is probably beyond my professional competence. 
As I wnte, the latest ed凶onof the International Herald Tribune tels me that出e
Clinton admims仕at10n'spohc1es for east Asia have been ’dominated by a coalition of 
stand pa町田・macroecononucpolicy mak悶 terrifiedthat a vigorous回 depolicy would 
spook白efinancial markets and depress the dollar further, and national sec町ityo節－
cials convinced曲目maintainmgAmerica's 50 year old Asian militarY alliances 1s 
血ekey to defending US. national secunty and burgeomng US. economic interests 
m the region' 1 Everything, we are encouraged to believe, JS wrong. The Umted 
S凶 esis app町entlya paper tiger stil livmg in也emental worlds of the Cold War e四，
白ebest forw町d，白erefore,in the nnpleasant 1990s 1s to s出 ngthenAmencan eco 
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nomic power and downplay its secunty posture, which seemmgly lacks credibility 
within ther右gionand at home For Alan Tonelson at 1国民・＇Asiansmay doubt A血eri回’s
mil1tary cred1b1hty, but由eystil urgently need Amencan capital, technology and, 
above al, markets. The wnter proposes，由e問fore,'tightly re思1latingAsian acc田s
to these assets' in order for也eUmted States to gam better ’access to Asian markets 
叩 dhelping to shape Asia’s白血reヂ Itis a message that is certain to be heard m-
creasingly on血es回mp出血eRepublicans concen回 teon regainmg the presidency 
司 ano節目曲目白eyfirmly believe to be theirs by right. 
Yet 1fthe critics risk exaggeratmg the issues, the defenders of the s阻佃squo 
provide no greater sustenance Take, for example, a ful ・page report from the En-
glish-language press in To匂o,which appeared the day before Tonelson’s article 
Instead of errors, we get nothing but good news The president of Itochu四d出evice 
pr•田identof the Amen can Chamber of Commer田 inJap叩 spokeat length on US-
Japan collaboration吐rroughout血eAsian-Pacific region 3 There was, of course, no 
mention of the Kobe fiasco, nothing but applause for the securiザconnections,no血－
ing on the Korean problem and gr，国tstress on the fact that Clinton admims住ation
had successfully r回chedIO回 de四 dfinance agr田men臼withJapan, but barely a 
word on血ec町 issue.'
In由eおceof considerable difficulties in 1995 it is the mtent1on of both the 
Clmton adm1mstration and the Mu回yamacoahtion cabinet to accen加atethe posi-
tive. Both sides wish to downplay their specific disagreements by arguing that出e
overall health of the relationship 1s not seriously impaired by local problems. Smee 
in the changing international environment, the Japanese government has more to 
lose m any weakening of the alliance it 1s，出e田fore,particularly at pains to stress its 
reliability as an ally阻d出 willmgnessto coope回teWI白 W田hington-imtants ex-
cepted. Unfo由皿ately,the disagreements a日 moresenous由ansome in Tokyo ap-
pear w1llmg to田cognize阻 d出egreatest d阻 gerto the US-Japan relationship is血at
a contmumg series of disputes may over time drain the alliance of its hfeblood. It is 
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not也atany one issue is l止elyto kil off the p町田ershipbut ra白er白atit nsks g富山－
ally los皿E出回p岡田ce白roughendless, m岡山bledisputes. It 1s more likely to be 
death by a thousand cuts than a smgle, highly publicised E抽 lens is，百1e1990s will 
clearly not provide a rerun of 1960 
TheKobe-c百s-Korea litany matte目 because1t may have an accumulative 
effect The damage is unfortunately harder to me田町e阻 dharder to coπect than a 
m吋or,mind-concentrat1昭 securitycrisis Indeed, I have long taken the view that 
US-Jap回開！anonsalmost田qui田 aperiodic clash to remmd both sides of their im-
po巾 nceto each other From也ebeg1rmmgs of the US-Japan partne四hip出erehave 
been regular earthquakes that in their aftershock at least have encouraged greater 
attention and sensitivity on both sides It is far from clear出at出edifficulties of the 
1990s can be自由dmto this earlier crisis・ reconciliation cycle. We are not gomg to 
get the cahn白atfollowed 1960 or the perhaps some、Nhatcomplacent academic con-
clusions ofDestler and Sato to白e田沿nom1c針ctionsof! 977 -1981血at'In the阻止
things seemed to work themselves out'.' 
By the s山田nerof 1995 audiences on both sides of the Pacific have come to 
accept出atthere will always be political, economic and international disputes be-
tween their nations, though whether there would always be a US-Jap皿 alliancewas 
far less widely considered The last mon出shave seen plenty of acnmony but litle 
wilhnguess to ask if alternatives exist. The most recent Mmistry ofForeign Affairs' 
Bluebook echoed the sentiments of earlier volumes in noting血at血emtensity of the 
四lationshipW描 boundto cause a degree of創ction.6It w田 as1f detenoration could 
be programmed into血C回lat1onshipwi血out印 yp副 icular自国自由at血emould might 
everb問 ak.'The dangerofovercomplacency provoking critics to cal for the sc田，p-
ping of也erelationship w田 rarelyconsidered 
S阻nding四 comfo此ablybetween the two camps, events from J叩 U町ytoJune
this year ought to have knocked some of the props away from the booster club's 
positionτ'he damage done by the refusal of Prime Mmister Murayama to accept US 
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offe四 ofimmediate田sis阻neein the wake of the Kobe disaster suggests that there is 
a shallowness to the relationship血atstands in corr住田tto a great deal of the rhetonc 
Japanese pubhc opinion has litle idea of the ilwil that the highly public and ex-
traordinanly shortsighted町ectionof overseas aid generated －四dcontinues to do so. 
Attempts by the Japanese Mmis位yof Foreign Affai四torepair出epublicity damage 
were generally unsuccessful, smce the arguments白atJapan could cope and that 
foreign medical叩 drescue te町田wouldonly get m the way were hardly borne out 
by the scenes on television 1出血ct曲目theChainn血 ofthe US Jomt Chie品。fS阻釘
ha pp四 edto be in Tokyo for milit町 discussionswhen the Kobe earthqu配 struck
and that trained personnel and the necessary helicopters and aircraft came四 were
available at short notice only underlines血emrshandhng of由etragedy. The fact曲目
in the a白ennathof the Kobe disaster many observe四 withmJap四 wereso quick to 
町geanAmeric叩－stylecoordinated em町gencyservi田 onthe government m Tokyo 
only underlines the omissions of the present四 d白eneed to learn音・omthe experi-
ences ofothers but stil, seemingly，世田ughumlateral action 
Amenca and indeed virtually the ntire intemal!onal community was sur-
pnsed by the detem四mtionof the Japanese state -at the national, regional and local 
levels -to rebuff foreign offers of assistance, civihan and military，畳間tworld and 
third world Of course, some of these well-meanmg ges回目sfrom outsiders were 
inapp回＞pnateor irrelevant but to so abruptly and openly吋ectemergency aid from 
Japan's closest -indeed only, fonnal ally”reqmres explanation. 
National sensitivities are obviously part of出eanswer but perhaps it w田 also
a reflection of Tokyo’s views of the hmited na加reof the entire US-Japan relation-
ship. From its incept10n m the days of John Foster Dulles and Yoshida Shigeru, 
Japanese perceptions of the li止sto由eUmted States have been mηower and less 
enthusiastic白田血eprofessions of針endship田dcoo戸rationvoiced by successive 
American ad!nmis位ationsand their attendant bureaucracies National memones of 
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血eextensive阻 dthorough位置isformationof post-surrender Japan dunng血eoccu-
pation ye町sremam quite divorced and the inequalities of the S叩 Franciscopeace 
settlements are easily recalled by Japan when required.φfoch田加回dedisputes m 
May 1995, Japanese commentators would invanably tel mass audiences that the 
United States h田 beentoo unfair and too tough on their small nal!on and editorial 
write四wouldinvoke yet again血eimage of Commodore Peロずs”blackships”about 
to cause mischief on叩叩suspectingAsian society ) 
The convenl!ona! Jap田eseassessment of its obligations to出eUS IS topomt 
to the provision by Tokyo ofrmhtary bases伽oughoutthe archipelago and to s岡田
the considerable financial burden曲目Japanhas underwntten m what is termed its 
”sympathy budget”to suppo此USfacilities from Okmawa -especially Okinawa -to 
Hold曲1doThe relative lack of success that the Umted States, Britam and Japan’s 
other量iendshave had in pe四回dingTokyo to play a larger intemal!onal role can be 
seen in the US government's bland description of the 1994 framework agreement 
wi血NorthKorea描 havmg’血es回 ngsupport of Japan and South Korea -key alhes 
whose security is directly at s恒keand who will provide most of出efinancmg for its 
implementation.’s In language ra田lyheard from Christopher, he stated bluntly 
that：’For many ye町s,the world has known that North Korea had an active nuclear 
weapons programme. Last白I,this adminis回 tionended 1t ' 
An import阻tlitmus test for US-Japan relations in the northeast Asian con-
text is出eextent of Tokyo's coope田tionover US policies towards the Kore渇npenin-
sula The evidence to date sug耳目tsthat successive Japanese govenirnents would 
much prefer to keep out of the spotlight. The domestic difficulties白atwould be 
raised by e1血erorbo血（1)the imposition of economic s叩 ctionson Pyongyang皿 d
(1i)m1h阻rya田IS胞nceto American forces m由eevent of direct confrontation would 
be immense.百iepast temptationおr也eJa戸neses阻teto say al the right things but 
to find re田onsfor limiting i白elfto cosmel!c acts would surely persist. 
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When血epossibility of econom1c叩 dfinancial s四cl!onslast was last aired 
in 1984 the開sponsefrom the Japanese sides was highly caut10us. The fact that Ko-
田an回sidentsm Japan are split mto twひgroups,supportmg the North and South 
Ko問anS也tesr田pectively,must act as a bamerofso出向rTokyo This, however, is 
a long established田alityand it remains doubtful whether this ought to rule out the 
s回 dingof any clear signals to North Korea Yet, hesital!on to deny even temporanly 
the dispatch ofおreignexchange to North Korean family members from their rela-
t1ves m Japan and the apparent limi阻tionson what exactly the Jap岨eseSelf De島nee
Forces could do to assist US mihtary acl!vities suggests that m any白加recrisis the 
political problems might resemble earher confusions over the middle east 
It would, perhaps, be m everyone's interest to clan守thedegree of Jap四国e
flex1b!lity towards North Korea Evidence that some efforts are being made has 
emerged recently but the imprecision and delays on altering the SDF role in prov1d-
ingre白ellmgand logistical support伯 theUS military apparently remains an unfor-
lunate fact Verbal and written assurances, even granted that they can be obtamed 
through US-Japan negotiations, have, of course, to be reassessed m the light of the 
circumstances prevailing, if and when the US embassy in Tokyo were to approach 
the Japanese governmentτbis imprecision hardly sugges白血atthe two nations are 
hkely to be m step or even guarantees血atthey might be in the same battalion 
Concern over Korean developments is far宜・omnew. But rec叩 tly血eUnited 
States has been able to persuade the Japanese cabinet曲目anmtemational approach 
towards supplymg North Korea with safer nuclear power facilities is necessary and 
in that sense Japan IS m 1995 far les of皿 observerand far more of叩 acl!vepartici-
p四tThe KEDO (Kore四 PeninsulaEnergy Development OrganIZation) consortium, 
comprising Japan, the United States and South Korea, is an indical!on that the 
Murayama coahtion cabinet has been able to act responsibly, despite domestic ob-
jectmns伽 tinclude the unease of one small party w1血mhisgo・四 mment.The agree-
ment ass凹nesthat Japan田etechnological四 dfinancial田SIS阻ncewill be forthcom-
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ing to promote greater cooperation on the pemnsula and that the gammg of Pyongy国民
confidence might lead to白eeventual reunification of Korea 
Tokyo would seem to prefer workmg in a multilateral group白叩havingto 
take sepa同胞actionby itself to further multtlateral obiecttves. The ”clothing", as it 
were，。f四 internationalgrouping probably自tsJapan better-or, to be more c戸ucal,
it is the least uncomおrtableway forward m the light of both North Korean nuclear 
dange四 andthe unease of some within Jap四 togoing it alone Any progress either 
wi出i臼regionalpar血e四 orindependently leads, of coun;e, to the issue of how Japan 
would then cope with a potentially stronger Korea. It may be optimistic to argue白at,
’while historical animosities between Korea and Japan will contmue to simmer, the 
overwhehning need for Japanese capi凶 munderwnting umfication may force Kore-
血sto dis宙開ciatenationalism and anti-Japaneseism, and elevate血1srelat10nship to 
a mature and less acnmonious level. ・VictorCha of Stanford continues：’This 
confluence of factors may therefore prompt Korea to consolidate ties w1由Japan叩 d
view China as出enew proximate出reat'."Any suspici叩 ofa問凹1tedKorea ”lean-
mg”on Tokyo would presumably be avoided strenuously by Japanese diplomats 
since 1t would hardly wish to be caught between the PRC and a united Korea. (There 
are already pl田町yof academic cnttcs within Japan who fe町 thatWashmgton is al-
ready pressing Tokyo relentlessly to cooperate against North Korea's nuclear capa-
bil山田百沼田individualswould be watchmg closelyおr阻 yindications ofa further 
d1plomat1c市ltmg”inno吋1eastAsia.) Unv01ced public concern over the future eco 
nomtc strengths of a umted Korea would also tend to reduce any sizable Japanese 
role in assisting too liberally m what nghtly or wrongly 1s widely perceived to be 
either a challenge or ”吐rreat＇’.Ko田aneconomists wntmg for Western audiences also 
play on this theme by instmctively reaching for comparisons between ti祖国rnatton 
阻 dthe economic advance of postwar Jap阻 .11
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Conclus1on 
It has become a commonplace to note the domestic problems facing al po・
lit1cal enllties m血e1990sτbe very brief sense of at least毘hef,ifnot euphori丸山at
followed the ending of the Cold War in Europe has been followed by economic and 
financial dislocation and by no evident clanty in international田lationsWithin出e
impo託antcontext of US-Japan relations we have a si加ationwhere both states町e
conscious of their own domestic fatlmgs and yet proclaim a wish simultaneously to 
問vise阻 dimprove their pa巾時四hipto better fit the Washmgton Tokyo alliance for 
newer and wider respons1bililles m Asia，四dpossibly beyond Two probably con回－
diciory processes appe.世 tobe at work: attent10n to onピsown back garden and a島町
出atwithout a radical overhaul the US-Japan問lationshipcould declme or even ex-
pire. What 1s missing is not any lack of awareness of血eproblem but much evidence 
of concerted political will to actually resuscitate the patient Jap皿、effortsto put 
flesh on its promises seems to me at least to be halfh目立ed,while the United States’ 
handling of Japan can also be criticised Both states profess a willingness to act re-
sponsibly and to do more cooperatively but the distance仕omspeech to action re-
mains as leng出yas before A generation ago the US-Japan relationship was said to 
beclo血edm excuses for what had not occurred -either by Jap印 infailing to reduce 
its 問中lusesor increase its se四ntypos回目orfrom the United States in failmg to 
improve 1ts economic s1回ationor consult more widely with Tokyo on secunty mat-
胞団－today we nsk drowning m good intentions官官rhetoricis splendid but the deed 
is not done. 
Rev1tahzation would require面ev1阻blygreater vision and supervision from 
bo血nations'political elites. There is h低lelikelihood of血isoccurring until after the 
next US presidential election and the process of party political田alignmenthas worked 
itselfout m Japan. For the next 18 months to two years we may have to tred water. 
Perhaps after白isinterlude there may be greater grounds for hope For now it is 
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necess町yfor白osedefending the relationship to so北upsome pumshing blows. Part 
of the damage will, of course, cゅmefrom their opponen白butpart w!ll also be self-
inflicted. Remarks by Japanese cabinet r血ISie回 on血e’enslavement'of their nation 
by the United States’Z町芭alreadytaking place and血e50白ann1ve田辺yof也eendmg 
of the Pacific War IS gu町四teedto ruffie feathers There is no escapmg critical sur-
veys of the last half century，由eview出atWashington was too benevolent and car-
ing of Japan Wiii be given a full hearing and the Japanese perception that It is sour 
g四p回世omDetroit阻 d血erust belt that explains al of the Amen can charges agamst 
Tokyo and Nagoya is everready田nmunitionfor repellmg borderers. If only白ose
Idle Americans would位ya bit harder opmions are never far from the surface at出e
best ohimes and are guaranteed to find a receptive audience when the going gets 
rough 
What IS hkely to be lackmg, unfo託unately,is any closely argued, balanced 
restatement of what has gone nght in the past two gene回tionsfor the Paci百calb-
叩 ce13 Yul回目bleleade四 areunlikely to jeopatize what reserves of good Wiii th巳y
possess at home on出ecomplicated and controversial subject of strengthening ties 
with what Wiii be bound to be a se田onof harsh memones and sad newsreels. After 
血ew町 stones訂eonce again behmd us -surely August 1995 Wiii be由efinal parade 
for血eveterans -and the election season IS also over.，出enperhaps we c四 S回rtagain 
My conclusion then ts, once agam, to go agamst the historian's ficl!tious 
回 deunion百碍回silienceand longevity of the US-Japan rela!!onship should not be 
seen as a perm阻 entsa自etynet; it could be false comfort to maintain that whatever 
出etrade dispute" or security qu町 elI Wiii be alright on the ni仰 Itmay be better 
to recognize白atcontinuing acnmony plus regional uncertainties suggest reason for 
caution The history of the Washington-Tokyo axis should not be interpreted as a 
crutch. Dangerous times require fresh thinking and more leadership白血ISpresently 
on display Political scientists and intemat10nal historians early in the next c印刷ry
may find themselves debating when It w抽出atthe Pacific alliance shifted its ground 
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for good from pnvate squabbles町田ng企i叩 dsto publtc rows among ex-allies Or to 
put this in academic teロns:how much longer c叩 weafford to wait for出eanswer to 
the demand first put by Edwin Reischauer in 1960 and more recently by Gerald 
Curtis in 1989 －’Wanted. A Coherent Strategy m US-Japan Relations'? It may be 
tempting fate to pe四国withe1tl町 theold rhe柏市orthe new silence To rely on出e
automatic pilot is to court danger." 
The political, economic and regional debates presently on the table are far 
骨・omnew. The c町 questiongoes back ne町Iytwo decades and the secunty issue to 
the E四tdays of the alliance in the early 1950s. Indeed the continuities in US-Japan 
relallons are extraordmary, but what appe町sto be changing in the mid-I 990s is白e
detennmations of Washington to press Japan harder to gain outcomes more to the 
hking of the Umted States now that the strategic imperatives of the past are less 
compelling Unfortunately for出eAmen cans出回eefforts to wrestle with Japan have 
not always白lyrecogmzed the strength and confidence of Tokyo, even when its 
political system is in near-con白sionand 1t has to con丘町tthe financial troubles of an 
overvalued cuπency and a bankmg system crippled with what is coyly tenned 
”unperfonning loans”The alacrity with which some US economic diplomats have 
approached the car阻lkssugg目白thatnot al of them may have know the brmsing, 
e油austingba凶esof yesteryear 
For血enear and medium teロnsthe alliance will surely contmue, despite血e
frequent maul mg -or what sections of the US press hke to describe田 gorng”headto 
head" on the mat. Its long tenn白血m，出血出ep拙t,will be conditioned by changes 
m出epower relationships of the Asia-Pacific問＇＆ton.Unttl there is 田dicalshift, it is 
difficult yet to see much alteration of the past pattem of US pressure and Japanese 
concessions It would take sigmficant evidence of US mili阻ryre紅白t仕omno：泊四回t
Asia印 dsecurity血realsto Japan from its neighbours, particularly with reg町dto出e
PRC叩dto a lesser extent on the Korean pemns叫a,to alter the s回tegicp問misesof 
Japanese foreign p。hcy.Only 1fthe US pulled back to the Guarn-Hawaii-Califomia 
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penmeter and Japan saw itself facing m1litaty challenges曲目mightcurtail free p田－
sage on由eseal an es世・omthe Malacca straits to Yokoh町田would the田 bea diplo-
matic revolution sc国＇ppmgthe US-Japan alhance and prompting substantial Japa-
nese remilitarization由roughimproved offensive capabilities. Neither item is likely 
for血enext decade -what is p町・hapsmore foreseeable is a gradual loosening of ties, 
while as in血epastAmenc叩 andJapanese leaders continue to profess their attach-
ment to the Pacific alliance What we might have would be四 mcreasmglys回ined
relationship, sufficiently impaired over time to make the final caes山富considerably
easier to be accepted by both parties, should the circumstances above materiahze. 
百官remamderof this decade could be a”softening up’・operationfor eventual sepa-
ration. The Kantor -Hashimoto talks would then have an importance to historians 
that is not necessarily the case if the negotiations are seen largely as spawned by 
domestic constituencies聞dhaving a th田町calso宜叩re出atendangers no one in出e
longterm 
Suggestions on how the relationship might be improved町e出ere思dardivi-
dend of academic conference and pubhc symposia Any very obvious list might be-
gin with perhaps some greater knowledge of the history of the alliance. I have been 
S回 ckin conve四ationswith US embassy officials in To旬。出tSspnnghow （りdtplo-
mats appear almost eager for a contest with Japan over血eautomobile c田ewithout 
(i) any apparent thought on the intennmable, wearing clashes of past trade qu田－
tions. Smce a former US embassy negotiator felt privately that there had been only 
one success釦loutcomem血eyear曲目hehad been involved in such market opemng 
measures (pharmaceuticals) I remain s叫 tlcalof any satisfactory conclusion The 
years ofbruismg ro凹 dsof inconclusive talks looks set to be repeated The timescale 
for血eautomobile negotiations tS in itself so leng由y血atit tS hard to imagine that the 
Umted States, Japan or the unfortunate World Trade Organizat10n can anticipate 
四戸hmgbuts岡田s16百 eearliest date for a ruling by the WTO’s dispute settlement 
body (DSB) may be出espring of 1996 and appeals and final judgements could coin-
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c1de with next autumn’s us p問sidentialc町npaign
Perhaps the best way forward in cases of economic questions 1s to hmit the 
negotiations to a m阻 ageablearea 17 To debate whether the Japanese ke1retsu system 
is by definition”凹白ir”阻dinherently discriminatory may lead nowhere. It should 
also be noted血at由es回nceof the US side 1S far仕omas innocent田 somesuggest. 
Americ田 newspape目白S!St曲目白ecar market m Japan is closed but European manu同
facturers have made sigmficant progress recently and would most certainly chal-
lenge the blanket claim that ’foreign producers either c叩 notget into Japan or their 
prices are kept artificially high’P It is also known血atwhile the US calls for dere伊ー
lation of白eJapanese economy, its diplomats have a substantial mterest mηustmg 
that血emfamous car inspection system (shaken) is maintamed, smce似 spermits 
more foreign-made components to be bought m Japan. 
If the record of the last gene回tionover US-Japan trade negotiations might 
serve as a reminder of the mconclusiveness of the outcomes -one former British 
制 bassadorto Tokyo has argued血atEuropean (and by extension the USA as well) 
efforts were needed essentially to prevent even wo四edisasters for domestic manu-
facturers what can be said of the manner in which the talks are held? Again, the 
obvious conclusion has to be that血emore public and仕・eneticthe discussions, the 
less the likelihood that comprom!Ses could be easily obtained To give one example 
from th!S Spnng: It serves litle p町 ose伽 Mr.日前himototo joke伽 t'Mr. Kantor 
is more sc恒y由加mywife when I come home under the influence ofalcohol', which 
led, of course, to equally sour remarks m加mfrom Mr. Kantor.19 When the two key 
紅adenegotiato四have血1Skind of personal relationship then it 1s d1伍cultto imagine 
much prospect for any immediate solution that might satis今bothparties." The 
m自ortunateconfrontational approach 1S by now too deeply 1mbedded into the trade 
talks by both governments and the respec!ive media of each nation日orthis to be 
easily correctable Although, it might certainly help 1f newspapers and telev!Sion 
reports were less subj出 ive,this again is most unlikely in the near fu回 e.The抑 0
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publics毘ce1velargely opposed greater involvement in UN peaceke叩mgoperations 
-its disconcerting to discover that virtually the onlyJapanese in the Balkans is Mr. 
Akashi回dthat血ewar1n血e問g1onreceives only the slightest of attention from由e
Jap田esetelevision netWorks obsessed出血eya開閉山田b阻 terronsmto the exclu-
sion of別式uallyeverythmg else m出eworld -and that another Cambodian-style 
ope目白oncould earn Jap回出ecredit血atit needs to regam the lost momentum over 
its C醐 paignfor permanent membership of the UN sec叩tycouncil 
羽田mostcompelling r町田tassessment of the changes required in Japanese 
foreign policy to田s1st出 nationalmterest阻 dreassure出 neighboursand American 
aly was made (most bravely) m Tokyo by Robert McNarn岡田F曲目白y白isyear." 
His attempts to encourage Jap加 toconsider tal<ing ’its nghtful place町nong血egreat 
powers’and at the very least to cooperate more publicly in the region and beyond 
gained, as Mr. McNama回 musthave realized, only the mildest of polite applause. 
The minimalism and 1mmob1hsm continues. Even to make suggestions that might 
see Japan offering greater con肘but1onsto sa島guardmghuman rights abroad or田－
sis也igrefugees, whe田，ofco旧se,Mrs Ogata is very much in the limelight田 UNHCR,
is unlikely to be regarded as any廿ungbut another unwelcome chore 22 The opinion 
ofMcNa田町aand many others that’the world needs Japan' is likely to remain un-
heeded other由叩m血eimportant are田 ofmternational回 de,fin叩 ce叩 dthe白nd-
ing of development programmes to what is politely termed the developing world 23 
Adopting a s戸iop!lcview of the entire US-Japan relationship m 1995 sug-
gests由at（司也eeconomic disputes, of which血eautomobile issue is出emost press-
ing, are a continuing問ality四 longas the回deimbalance remains at or田町C山rent
levels and po託ionsof the American pubhc and their Congress perceive Japanese 
markets to be ”closed"; and血at(i）血eendmg of the Cold War’s s回tegicimpe回－
tives poses the new danger to the Pacific alliance ofpoli!lcal and security issues 
b田omingclosely linked to the longstanding economic and financial differences. To 
prevent any白rtherdeterioration it might there品目makesense if (ii) the Japanese 
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由民couldbe pe目uadedto more openly demons回 tea sense of international respon-
Sibihty over issues that are within the provisions of its constitution, have sizable 
抑制icsupport and町ekno・町itobem蹴描ofproven Japan田ecompetency. This so-
called ”burden sharing”ーitwould surely help if a more posillve phrase could be 
自oundto replace what sounds al too uncomfortably to Japanese ears as some出ing
that is destined to be a costly foreign imposition in terms of life and exchequer -
might then serve to help prevent any worsenmg of the trade disputes.、1.'hatis re-
quired is something more substanllal th朗自e目白ergrudging efforts to date by Japan 
to demons位制e血atit can田 S町田問g10nal田 dglobal tasks. The present combinati叩
of ”chequebook diplomacy" but limited human involvement at the governmental, 
corporate and citizen levels wins few new friends and influences only the already 
converted. 
Obviously the Japanese gov叩 unentalone can determine what is politically 
acceptable at home when making出 int・開国ionalbid Perhaps at a minimum itought 
to consider presentations of the issues under discussion" It would be foolhardy to 
imagme much change in the American view由atonly managed trade can pry open 
Japanese markets and the Jap四 esear思iment出atthe culprit is出eUS government 
for turning its back on free trade and the Amencan manufacturers for madequate 
attention to the Japanese market. 
Cl田rly血iscontmuing hesitancy in自oreignpolicy, coupled wi白freshAmeri-
can doubts over its economic dealmgs with Jap叩，leavesTokyo in difficulties Its 
ties to the United States form the自oundationsof its postwar resurgence and any 
substantial reduction in the value of the sec町itytreaty by Washmgton would have 
dramatic consequences for Japan and the entire regional pic加国.To ensu自由atthis 
prospect can be avoided future Japanese governments h由epost-M山可制nae田 must
explam, expand and lead The p田sentmdeロsivenessin gaining a mored戸田町C阻 d
responsible intemabonal role that better reflects its economic strong由scanonly wor吉田
Japan’s standing with those in出eUmted States who are exasperated by Tokyo's 
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国 dingbehaviour. (There would also have to be m句orre叫jus回 entsby the United 
States to accommodate a more assertive Japan but that for the moment is an issue 
whose time has not yet come.) 
It is certainly premature to s阻rtdiscussing叩ypeロnanentb田akdownin US-
Japan ties but 泊施四目lyappropriate to ask whether the accumulation of s回 insmay 
not nsk damaging血e田lationshipin such a ma凹ieras to leave it increasingly less 
effective Even the Pen阻gon's recent survey of tl岡田gioncould not do much better 
血anadmit ’Our security alliance with Japan 1s由ehnchpm of US secunty m Asia 
We must not allow trade friction to undermme our security alh四 ce,but if pubhc 
support for the問lationshipis to be mamtamed over the long teロn,progress must 
continue to be made by both sides in addressing ft皿damentaleconomic issues，お
After the trade disputes of 1995, it is certain that new areas of dissatisfaction will 
appe町.The rapidity ofJapan’s economic rise and the dislocat10ns出at出IShas cre-
ated for the Umted States guarantees contmumg readJUS回目nts.The balancing act 
between mamtaining the close defense ties, while cons阻ntlynegotiating on血e位百de
仕・ontcan only become harder. It will prove a formidable challenge into the next 
cen加ry戸 Withoutmore constructive political lmks it is no longer merely scare-
mongering to envisage a”、羽田LostJapan？”debateafter 2010. Corrective action to 
おrestallsuch a possibility had better s回rtsoon. 
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神戸・自動車・北朝鮮
く要約＞
ロジャー.I~ ックレイ
この論文は現在の日米関係における諸問題を考察し，悪化しつつある2
国間関係を改善する為の提案を試みるものである。
本文では1995年に日米官界同盟が抱える問題（神戸・自動車・北朝鮮）
を取り上げ，歴史的枠組の中に位置づけている。
結論として深まりつつある日米関の講を埋め予想される将来の緊張を緩
和する為に今，多大な努力が必要である。
